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Abstract 
Corporate governance assesses the efficiency and effectiveness of companies’ operations and 
decisions to ensure value creation for shareholders and optimal risk taking. As investors’ 
decision making process largely depends on financial information and corporate reports, 
transparency is capital for the stability of a company, or even the stability of a country via the 
corporate sector. This research introduces the system reliability theory to properly model the 
behavior of companies regarding their corporate governance mechanisms. We propose the 
assessment of the corporate governance framework by mapping its inputs as components 
(either in operating or failed state) along with firm characteristics to determine an approximate 
Structure Function that enables alternatively modeling the functioning of the system, 
quantifying its reliability and detecting critical components. The advantage of the proposed 
mapping approach is illustrated using a sample of 1,109 U.S. listed companies during the 
period 2002-2014, reporting financial and non-financial information as components of the 
corporate governance system and the return on assets as the system output. The proposed 
approach is also useful for modeling other non-engineering sub-systems; companies, financial 
markets or even economies would be exposed to significant risk if these systems do not 
function properly. 
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Corporate governance focuses largely on internal mechanisms related to board function and 
structure, stock ownership structure, and remuneration incentives as well as external 
mechanisms that consider investor protection, law enforcement, and property rights. In general, 
scholars emphasise that corporate governance could be considered as a system for assessing 
corporate control and risks from conflicts of interests and misalignment between managers and 
shareholders (investment risk), or between large shareholders and minority shareholders 
(equity risk); see, for example [1-4].  
Corporate governance systems have also been in the centre of the major world scandals and 
systemic risks, which involve unethical behaviour [5], shareholder value destruction [6], and 
accounting fraud [7], to name some. For instance, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis many 
problems arose, which were notably associated with top managerial remuneration, lack of 
transparency, risk management, and lack of regulation [6, 8-10]. Despite the difficulties, 
market participants continue to require more information related to corporate governance, and 
decision makers are more aware of companies’ transparency [6].  
In terms of the corporate governance framework, several authors ([11-13], among others) have 
perceived it as a system composed of “practices” and “mechanisms” that ensures that 
managers’ practices are aligned to shareholders’ interests through the board of directors in 
order to create a stable environment to generate profits and reduce business risks [3-4]. 
As an example, many studies suggest that corporate governance ratings and indices (e.g., 
information disclosure, reporting and compliance) could be linked to firm performance, namely 
the well-known return on assets (ROA) [7, 14]. In this case, corporate governance performance 
and its particular aspects such as board size and independence, and corporate ownership 
structure are considered as the input variables of the system while ROA is defined as the 
system output. We argue that the lack of proper “functioning” in the input variables could 
affect system output. For example, the benefits of a company or its financial stability could be 
affected. At the macro level, those effects could put under risk the money and capital markets 
and the economy of a country. 
Cormier et al. [15] and Mahr et al. [16] emphasise that information disclosure is a key aspect 
for assessing whether boards are effective in controlling managers and aligning them to the 
shareholders’ interests, and consequently to their corporate governance practices. In other 
words, transparency is a key aspect to make companies and financial markets more reliable, 
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mainly because it reduces monitoring costs incurred by investors’ demand when they want to 
gather appropriate financial and non-financial information.  
In this paper, departing from the extant literature, we propose a study of the corporate 
governance framework from the system reliability theory point of view, mapping input 
variables to system components and analysing under what conditions the corporate governance 
system “operates or fails”. To this end, we derive its approximate structure function (SF) [17] 
that mimics the functioning of the system for given states of its components. Using the SF, 
decision makers could analyse, for example: 1) which components affect the system the most; 
2) what type of corporate governance components enhance the functioning of companies; and 
3) the probability that the system is operating. To the best of our knowledge, this type of 
assessment, for the corporate governance framework, has not been considered in the literature. 
The proposed mapping approach is implemented on a case study containing 1,109 listed 
companies in the U.S. market during the time period 2002-2014 (8,412 company-year 
observations). These companies have reported financial information available in Reuters 
Datastream™ and Thomson One™ information systems, and non-financial information (i.e., 
corporate governance) in the segment ASSET4 ESG in Datastream for the mentioned period. 
As in many other publications not directly related to the engineering area, such as health care 
[92-94], financial crisis [8], political decisions [95], evaluation of priorities in the business 
process [96], risk perception [97-98], organizational learning [99-100], security of energy 
supply of a country [101], food safety management [102], risk governance [103], risk and 
performance management [104-105], quality and safety models [92], organizational failures 
[96], among others, the proposed approach considers a specific system and discusses aspects of 
financial implications, managerial perspectives or risk interpretation. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces corporate governance as a 
system, and describes the role of companies’ disclosure and transparency on the system 
stability. Section 3 presents a general overview about the reliability of a system, and how the 
structure function can be derived. Section 4 describes the main aspects to map corporate 
governance components and specific conditions in this field. Section 5 presents the 
characteristics of the case study while Section 6 shows the main results and discussions. 
Finally, section 7 concludes the papers and outlines some future research directions.   
The acronyms (the singular and plural of an acronym are always spelled the same) and 





ARE Approximated Reliability Expression 
CGA Corporate Governance Assessment 
DT Decision Tree 
LLM Logic Learning Machine 
ML Machine Learning 
NN Neural Networks  
RE Reliability Expression 
ROA Return on Assets  
SDP Sum of Disjoint Products  
SVM Support Vector Machine  
 
Notation Explanation 
x (x1, x2, …, xN)
T state vector, denotes the state of all the components 
of a system 
E[] Expected value operator 
N Number of components 
P, Q (P1, P2, …, PN)
T, (Q1, Q2, …, QN)
T state vector of probabilities 
Pi  Probability that component i is operating. 
Qi (=1-Pi) Probability that component i is failed.  
R Reliability of the system 
SF(x) The structure function 
xi  The state of a component, binary  
y Output of the system 
 
 
2. Corporate governance system and disclosure 
Corporate governance is a set of practices and mechanisms (hereafter components) that assures 
that companies can allocate their resources according to their objectives but also they are 
managed in the best interest of shareholders [6, 18-20].  
Lipton & Rosenblum [13] were one of the first authors who introduced corporate governance 
as a system. They claim that this system works in two perspectives: i) it ensures alignment 
between managers and shareholders, and ii) it creates a stable environment to generate 
sustainable profits. Alterations on the system components could harm companies’ benefits and 
even an economy overall.  
Corporate governance can be divided into internal and external sub-systems. The internal sub-
system is related to firm level mechanisms to deal with conflict of interests among shareholders 
and those who control business [5, 21-22]. The external sub-system considers country level 
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aspects (e.g., investor protection, law enforcement, property rights, and government 
intervention) to protect stakeholders from corporate fraud or theft [3-4].  
Table 1 reports some scholarly perspectives about this system, which provides the guidelines to 
evaluate it according to the lenses of reliability systems. 
Table 1 
Corporate governance as a system approach 
 
According to these authors, corporate governance can be seen as a system with many input 
variables or components (practices, mechanisms, accountabilities, and so forth) where 
managers, shareholders, and the board of directors are aligned to make companies to perform 
their required system output function such as profit generation, value creation, among other 
aspects. Furthermore, decision makers evaluate the level and types of information disclosure 
about corporate governance practices, and assess whether it is functioning properly [27-29].  
Table 2 presents some literature related to financial disclosure and reporting, the level of firm 




Transparency (reporting and disclosure) into a corporate governance system 
 
The literature reported in Table 1 and Table 2 only analyses the determinants (i.e., explanatory 
power – traditional regression analysis) of corporate governance components on firm 
performance. However, because the majority of components (categorical or nominal variables 
such as comply or not, disclose or not, report or not, and so forth) present high degrees of time 
invariant, low variability across time, consistently estimating the effects of time invariant 
variable in a regression model is problematic [107]. However, far too little attention has been 
paid to the usage of a reliability model, where decision makers can assess which corporate 
governance inputs (operating or failure) are important for the correct functioning of the system. 
Finally, it can be noted that disclosure or lack of reporting allows characterising whether 
companies have their corporate governance components in an operating or failed state. This 
suggests that corporate governance can be modelled as a reliability system.  
From this review, several aspects can be summarised: 
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 There is a set of N input variables x = (x1, x2,…, xN) (binary or continuous). Each company 
could be evaluated using this set of variables.  
 There is a set of output variables (binary or continuous) that assesses the performance of 
the company. 
 The set of input variables, even if defined from theoretical or practical aspects, is not 
complete.  
 The possible relationship between x and one selected output y is given by y = F(x), where F 
is an unknown function that must be determined or at least approximated. 
These considerations allow us to map the corporate governance assessment (CGA) to a well-
known mathematical model used in the reliability field through a SF, which is capable of 
modelling the functioning of the system for given states of its corporate governance 
components. 
 
3. Structure Function of a System 
In this section, we briefly review the concept of the structure function of a system, its 
definition, the relationship with the reliability of a system and how it is derived in simple cases 
[85-91]. In addition, we describe how the structure function could be found in systems where 
the relationship between the components and the output of a system is unknown, using 
computational techniques derived from the machine learning paradigm [39]. 
3.1. Introduction 
The structure function is a classical and powerful tool for any reliability quantification, such as 
the estimation of the probability of failure of a system, comparison among system designs or 
the identification of those components “that are most critical, from a reliability/safety point of 
view and that should be given priority with respect to improvement” [85] Even if new aspects 
related to SF have been presented in the literature (e.g., imprecise probability, signature 
function or the survival signature (see [85] and references therein)) we consider that the 
mapping approach based on classical SF is enough for our main purpose. 
We consider a system defined by: a) components or elements in two possible states (operating 
and failed); b) states are statistically independent events; and c) the system is coherent [17, 91].   
The state xi of the i
th component is defined as [17, 35]:  
𝑥𝑖 = {
1 (𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒)
0 (𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒)       




Let Pi and Qi  = 1-Pi be the probabilities that component i is operating or failed respectively. 
Note that E[xi] = Pi. 
Let x = (x1, x2,…, xN)
T be a vector representing the state of a system containing N components.  
Then, the performance of the system could be described as [17, 85-86, 91]:   
𝑦 = 𝑆𝐹(𝒙) = {
1, if the system is operating in this state
0, if the system is failed in this state       
                                                  (2) 
where SF is the Structure Function which expresses the state of the system in terms of the 
states of its components [91].  
The SF:{0,1}N→{0,1}  is a Boolean function, composed by terms associated to the state of 
the components xi (and/or complements xi̅) that perfectly describes the operation of a system. 
To illustrate, consider a system modelled by the network in Figure 1 [36]. In this network, 
components 1 and 3 are functionally connected in series, components 2 and 4 are functionally 
connected in series, and their equivalents 1-3 and 2-4 are functionally connected in parallel. 
The SF of this network could be directly derived, taking into account that the system is in the 
operating state if (components 1 AND 3) are operating OR (components 2 AND 4) are 
operating, that is: 𝑆𝐹(𝒙) = 𝑥1𝑥3 + 𝑥2𝑥4. In this expression, the term 𝑥1𝑥3 is read as 𝑥1 AND 
𝑥3 while the “+” is read as OR. 
Figure 1. A four-component network [36]  
 
The SF “plays an essential role in reliability assessment” [85]. In fact, the reliability of the 
system could be calculated as [86-91]: 
𝑅 = 𝑃(𝑆𝐹(𝒙) = 1) = E[𝑆𝐹(𝒙)]                          (3) 
In general, the SF could be transformed to an equivalent expression where only sum of disjoint 
products (SDP) are used [47, 59]. From this transformed expression it is easy to derive the 
symbolic Reliability Expression (RE) of the system: 1) logical sums and products are replaced 
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with sums and products of real numbers; and 2) every term xi or complement xi̅ is replaced by 
Pi or Qi respectively [36,59]. For the system in Figure 1, the original SF(x) = x1x3+x2x4 is 
converted into the equivalent expression 𝑆𝐹(𝒙) = 𝑥1𝑥3 + ?̅?1𝑥2𝑥4 + 𝑥1𝑥2?̅?3𝑥4 where only SDP 
terms appear. Finally, 𝑅𝐸(𝑷, 𝑸) = 𝑃1𝑃3 + 𝑄1𝑃2𝑃4 + 𝑃1𝑃2𝑄3𝑃4, where P and Q =1-P are the 
vectors representing the probability of operation and failure of the components respectively.  
The numerical evaluation of the RE could be used, for example to: i) determine the reliability 
of the system; ii) solve optimisation problems (e.g., the classical reliability allocation problem 
[37]); or iii) determining the importance of the components (e.g., by using the Birnbaum index 
or any other importance measures [38]). 
However, in many real cases, the SF of a system could not be directly derived (e.g., the 
relationship among the state of components and the state of the system is unknown). In these 
cases, computational approaches are suggested to determine the SF. In the next section, we 
describe one of these approaches, based on the machine learning paradigm [39]. 
3.2. Machine learning approach for determining SF 
3.2.1 Introduction 
When the relationship between the components and the output of a system is unknown, as in 
our corporate governance problem, standard classification techniques, based on the machine 
learning (ML) paradigm could be employed to derive an approximate model [40, 83]. The most 
commonly used techniques in the reliability context are: neural networks (NN) [39], support 
vector machines (SVM) [40], Decision Trees (DT) [41-42], and Logic Learning Machine 
(LLM) [43], among others. 
ML techniques have been used in many real situations such as to classify operation anomalies 
in nuclear systems [84], to detect important factors in multi-criteria decision model [79], to 
derive surrogate models to speed-up Monte Carlo simulations [40, 83], to perform pump failure 
rate analysis [41], to name a few. In [36, 42, 46], ML techniques were used to derive the SF of 
a general system, modelled as a network.  
8 
 
The basic idea when using any ML technique is: a set of different states of the system along 
with the components states (the training set) is examined by the selected technique in order to 
assess whether a proposed analytical expression can be used to adequately mimic the behaviour 
of the system.  
In some approaches (e.g., NN or SVM) the analytical expression of the operation derived 
generally includes non-linear terms (or operators), whose meaning is difficult to interpret. 
Other approaches are based on rule generation methods or rule learners [44] (e.g., DT, LLM), 
that is, techniques that produce a set of logical rules that describes the binary function SF. In 
general, the rules have the well-known if-then-else structure. For example: if (𝑥𝑖 = 1) then 
y=1 (the system is operating) else y=0 (the system is failed). In any case, the models derived 
properly mimic the system output, given the states of the input variables.  
In this paper we consider the use of rule learners that allows an easy interpretation of the results 
as well as a fast reliability assessment of a company governance system and company 
characteristics.  
3.2.2 Decision tree 
A DT produces a set of conjunctive decision rules. In this format, there are only “AND”s 
within each rule, but each rule exists within an if-then-else structure. For example, consider the 
system shown in Figure 1. Using all of the possible states in the network (i.e., 24 =16) and 
determining the system output by inspection (shown in Table 3, i.e., the training set), the DT 
presented in Figure 2 is derived [36]. 
 
Table 3 
Component and system states for the network shown in Figure 1 
Figure 2  
Example of a decision tree [36]  
 
To determine if a selected network configuration is operating or not, its components’ states are 
analysed. First, the DT verifies the state of component 2 (x2): if x2 = 1 (i.e., operating) then the 
DT selects the right branch and verifies the state of component 4 (x4). If component 4 is failed 
(i.e., x4 = 0), the left branch is selected and a final conclusion is derived: the system is failed 
(y=0). On the other hand, if component 4 is operating (i.e., x4 = 1), the right branch is selected 
and it is concluded that the system is operating. A similar procedure is defined in the case that 
the first test related to the component 2 concludes that component 2 is failed. 
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The structure of a binary DT corresponds to a direct acyclic graph. Each node corresponds to a 
decision node with links to other nodes or a leaf node. At any decision node, a test on the state 
of a specific component is performed, while any leaf node represents the state of the system 
[45]. This special structure allows extracting different rules to be able to conclude the state of 
the system by following the paths from the starting node (the root) to any leaf node:  “Every 
node encountered produces a condition to be added to the if part of the rule; the final leaf 
contains the output value to be selected when all the conditions in the if part are satisfied. Since 
the tree is a direct acyclic graph we have as many rules as leaves” [45]. For example, the 
following set of disjoint decision rules solves the problem in Figure 2: 
if x1 = 0 AND x2 = 0  then y = 0 
else if x1 = 0 AND x4 = 0 then y = 0 
else if x2 = 0 AND x3 = 0 then y = 0 
else if x3 = 0 AND x4 = 0 then y = 0 
else y = 1 
 
Other rule learner approaches (for example, LLM) produce a set of compact rules for each 
class. For the previous example, the LLM approach produces the following rules:  
if (x1=1 AND x3=1) then y = 1; 
if (x2=1 AND x4=1) then y = 1 
which is equivalent to the SF for this network SF(x) = x1x3+x2x4. 
In general, LLM produces better results than DT does [46]. However, the SF derived is not in 
disjoint form. Hence, an additional transformation is required (e.g., the algorithm KDH88 [47]) 
to convert the SF to RE. 
In many cases, the set of rules [46] derived are associated with special operators with a 
physical interpretation. For example, the set of rules for the class failed could correspond to the 
set of min-cuts or min-paths [86-89, 91].  
3.2.2 Approximating the SF 
In real cases, the training set could not be completely derived by inspection since there are 
many system states to be analysed, the conditions for operation are not evident, or, as in the 
corporate governance problem, the information is limited. In these cases, classification 
techniques are only able to extract an approximation of the SF of a system and, consequently 
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only an approximated RE (ARE). In general, the approximation of the SF to the real one is 
better as long as the samples in the training set increase. 
In order to apply a classification method to generate the SF, the set of all of pairs (xi, yi) 
(representing different components and system states) is organised in two subsets to be used in 
the training phase and in the subsequent performance evaluation of the resulting set of rules. To 
this end, NT+NE pairs (xi,yi) have been randomly assigned to each subset. The first NT pairs are 
then used to form the training set, whereas the remaining NE pairs are employed to evaluate the 





 ;  𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
TN
TN+FP





 TP (respectively, TN) is the number of examples belonging to the class y = 1 
(respectively y = 0) for which the classifier gives the correct output,  
 FP (respectively, FN) is the number of examples belonging to the class y = 1 
(respectively y = 0) for which the classifier gives the wrong output. 
For reliability assessment, sensitivity and specificity give the percentage of correctly classified 
operational states and correctly classified failed states, respectively.  
Although the performance of the selected technique is an important aspect to be considered, it 
is also important that the classifier derived has the ability to comply with technical aspects 
observed in the real system [36, 39-42]. 
 
4. The proposed mapping 
In this section we describe how the corporate governance assessment is mapped into a 
reliability model. 
Table 4 shows a hypothetical set of 19 companies in a given year and country (i.e., the system), 
and three particular input variables or components associated with board structure, coded as 
binary variables. The complete set of input variables to be used is described in section 5. For 
example: i) bs_poly_r = 1 means that a company has a policy for maintaining a well-balanced 
membership of the board; ii) bs_expe_r = 0 means that companies lack disclosing the number 
of years, on average, how long each member has been on the board; and iii) bs_noexe_r =1 
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indicates that companies report the percentage of non-executive members belonging to the 
board.  
The average ROA (roa_mean1) is selected as the system output y. A roa_mean1 =1 means that 
the system is in the operating state when a company is outperforming a reference value and 
roa_mean1 =0 shows that the system is the failed state.    
Table 4 
Components and system states for a corporate governance system 
 
The main idea of the proposed approach is to use a ML algorithm to extract an SF that mimics 
the behaviour of the corporate governance assessment (as described in 3.2.2).  
This mapping to a reliability system gives a practical advantage for decision makers because:  
1) It characterises the corporate governance components (operating or failure), enhances 
corporate transparency (disclosure and reporting) as a central aspect of the system 
reliability.  
2) It evaluates under what corporate governance conditions and firm-specific 
circumstances the system is functioning.   
3) The ARE derived could be used to numerically estimate the probability of system 
functioning as well as component importance indices. 
5. Case study 
5.1. Data section 
The case study for mapping the corporate governance assessment to reliability systems uses a 
dataset from 1,203 U.S. listed companies during the period from 2002 to 2014. The financial 
information is obtained from Reuters Datastream™ and Thomson One™, and the non-financial 
information is from the ASSET4 ESG module in Datastream. Companies are classified 
according to the data providers in ten economic sectors based on the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC). Finally, after correcting the dataset from some data anomalies 
(e.g., missing data, blanks, duplicates, non-available “NA”), the original panel of 15,639 
company-year observations were reduced to 8,412 observations on 1,109 companies after the 
data cleaning (see Table 5). 
Table 5 




5.2. Corporate governance components 
The segment ASSET4 ESG in Datastream identifies 33 corporate governance components that 
companies need to disclose and report. These components belong to five corporate governance 
perspectives: board structure, board function, compensation policy, shareholder rights, and 
vision and strategy.  
Table 6 shows the meaning of their states in the form of operating “1” and failure “0”. These 
binary values come from the evaluation of the data provided by Datastream, and also follow 
the best corporate governance practices in terms of disclosure and transparency [1, 48]. 
Table 6. 
Corporate governance components 
 
Finally, some data adjustments were also considered regarding data anomalies in order to 
characterise the component states. For example, a component recorded as “NA” is considered 
in the failed state.  
 
5.3. System output y (firm performance) 
Several empirical studies investigating into corporate governance and firm performance have 
tended to focus on specific governance components such as board structure, ownership, board 
function and duality [14, 18, 49-52]. These studies suggest that return on assets (ROA) is a 
central aspect to link corporate governance components to firm performance and hence will be 
considered as the system output in our model.  
ROA, the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total assets, 
measures how efficient managers are using the company’s resources to generate profits [7, 14, 
18, 49-52]. Thereupon, to map this information into the proposed system approach, the variable 
roa_mean1, for a given year, is defined as 1 if the system is operating in this state (i.e., a firm’s 
ROA is outperforming the industry), 0 otherwise.  
 
5.4. Company-specific characteristics (other system conditions) 
Previous econometric approaches have stated that firm-specific conditions also affect firm 
performance. For example, companies’ age [49, 52, 56], number of business segments [52], 
debt structure [49, 52, 57], size [56, 58], growth opportunities [59-60], and firm risk [7, 52] are 
among the firm-specific conditions.  
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Based on such works, the reliability systems approach presented in this paper takes into 
consideration also firm-specific conditions in order to illustrate their potential influences on the 
system output. These specific conditions are explained as follows:    
 Debt (ltdebtasset_mean1): this is the ratio of the company’s long-term debt to total assets 
adjusted by the industry information form Datastream. For example, a company’s debt ratio 
above the industry takes a value of 1 (overleveraged), 0 otherwise. 
 Size (mv_mean1): it takes into account market value of equity of a company adjusted by the 
industry information form Datastream. Thus, firm value above mean company value for the 
industry takes a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
 Growth opportunities (mtb_mean1): this is the market-to-book ratio of a company, which is 
a proxy for growth opportunities associated with companies. This ratio is also adjusted by 
the industry information from Datastream: the ratio of the firm above the mean value for 
the industry takes a value of 1, 0 otherwise. 
 Risk or stock price volatility (nvolreturn_mean1): it is computed from the monthly 
company return index (RI in Datastream) using the standard deviation of the past 12 
months: the standard deviation of returns of a firm above the corresponding mean standard 
deviation for the industry takes a value of 1, 0 otherwise.  
 Age (comp_age): this element (categorical variable) takes into consideration both a 
company’s foundation date and incorporation date and for those companies delisted, age is 
then adjusted appropriately. This information is found in Thomson One. 
 Number of business segments (numbusegm): this measures the number of business 
segments (categorical variable) reported by each company at the end of the fiscal year. This 
information is also obtained from Thomson One.  
The training set is selected with the 70% of the total pairs (x, y) [62] and the rest of pairs are 
assigned to the testing data set. However, to avoid considering more samples in a class than in 
another, a set of 8,412 samples is selected with approximately 50% of each class, from the total 
pairs.  
As previously mentioned, DT algorithms produce rules that are easily converted to RE. For this 
reason, we use a DT algorithm implemented in the WEKA environment [63-64]: namely the 
J48 algorithm [39, 65-66]. 
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6. Results  
6.1. Association rules and the Birnbaum index 
The procedure J48 from Weka extracts a set of 246 rules with performance indices:  
 
Training phase Testing phase 
Accuracy= 71.55%. 
TP= 64.3%; FP = 35.7% 
TN= 78.8%; FN=  21.2% 
Accuracy= 83.32%. 
TP= 88.1%; FP = 11.9% 
TN= 79.4%; FN=  20.6% 
 
A qualitative analysis of the rules reveals that 16 out of the 33 variables appear at least once in 
the set of rules. The number of conditions in a rule varies between 2 and 23. 
Examples of some generated rules are as follows (highlighted terms correspond to 
components): 
1) IF mtb_mean1 = 0 AND nvolreturn_mean1 = 0 AND bs_expe_r = 0 THEN y=0   
2) IF mtb_mean1 = 0 AND nvolreturn_mean1 = 0 AND bs_expe_r =1 AND bf_inomcom_r = 0 AND  
bf_bmeet_r = 0 THEN y= 0 
3) IF mtb_mean1 = 0 AND nvolreturn_mean1 = 0 AND bs_expe_r =1 AND bf_inomcom_r = 0 AND
 bf_bmeet_r =1 AND vstr_csrxaud_r = 0 AND numbusegm = 1 THEN y=1 
4) IF mtb_mean1 = 0 AND nvolreturn_mean1 = 0 AND bs_expe_r =1 AND bf_inomcom_r = 0 AND
 bf_bmeet_r =1 AND vstr_csrxaud_r = 0 AND numbusegm > 1 THEN y=1 
Note that, for a company with mtb_mean1 = 0 and nvolreturn_mean1 = 0, rule 1) corresponds 
to a first-order cut set.  
As previously mentioned, all of the rules with the condition y =1 can be used to derive the 
ARE. For example, one of the terms associated with ARE, valid for companies with:  
mtb_mean1 = 0 AND nvolreturn_mean1 = 0 AND numbusegm = 1, is shown as below:  
P(bs_expe_r =1)*P(bf_inomcom_r =0)*P(f_bmeet_r =1)*P(vstr_csrxaud_r =0) 
where, for example, P(bf_inomcom_r =0) is the probability that component  bf_inomcom_r is 
“failed”: the company does not report the percentage of non-executive board members on the 
nomination committee. 
The ARE can then be used to estimate the reliability of any selected company, that is, the 
probability that a selected company’s ROA is outperforming its industry. 
To illustrate, let’s consider a company with the following characteristics: numbusegm = 2 and 
comp_age = 4. Let’s further assume that for this company, the probability of failure of all of 
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the components is 0.10 (noting that probability values could be estimated from yearly records 
of the company). Then, the numerical evaluation of the ARE results in a reliability level of 
almost 0.90 (0.8934). Note that, to the best of our knowledge, the likelihood of this corporate 
aspect is difficult to quantify using traditional approaches.  
 
6.2. Model assessment 
As previously mentioned, an important aspect that must be considered when using a surrogate 
model is its ability to comply with technical aspects observed in the real system. To illustrate 
this issue, first, we evaluated the importance of the components of the company with 
numbusegm =2 and comp_age =4, using the well-known Birnbaum reliability index (Figure 3). 
In this figure, a large index means that a small change in the reliability of a component will 
result in a comparatively large change in the system reliability ([38]). 
 
Figure 3. 
 Birnbaum index of components for a company with numbusegm =2 and comp_age =4 
 
The analysis of the Birnbaum index reveals that the reliability-mapping approach proposed is 
able to correctly mimic the behaviour of the system analysed. For example: 
a) Figure 3 shows that the variable mtb_mean1 (grow opportunities above the industry) is 
crucial for the reliability of the system. This aspect is aligned with the literature [59-60] 
because a high market-to-book ratio indicates how well managers are using a firm’s 
resources to drive current and future performance as it reveals high expected future cash 
flows. For instance, using the cash holding on value increasing projects [67], enhancing 
R&D investment and speeding innovations [68] are among such aspects.   
b) The Birnbaum index attributed to component “reporting corporate social responsibility” 
(vstr_grcguid_r) influences the well-functioning of the system relative to the other 
corporate governance mechanisms. Some authors [69-71] argue that engaging in 
socially responsible activities enhances firm performance; however, this depends on 
specific companies’ supply and demand conditions [69]. Wang & Hsu [70] and Mishra 
& Suar [71] show that fulfilling corporate social responsibility would impact positively 
on firm performance.  
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c) The Birnbaum index for the component bf_bmeetave_r (reporting information 
associated with the average of board meetings) impacts on the trustworthiness of the 
company. This aspect has been studied in [72-73] but with inconclusive nexus with firm 
performance.  
To provide a second test for assessing the strength of the model derived, let’s consider that all 
of the probabilities of failure of the components could vary in [0.05, 0.15], comp_age = 4 and 
the number of business segments could vary (i.e., 4, 6, and 8). The uncertainties are modelled 
by uniform independent distributions and a simple Monte Carlo approach, based on 10,000 
samples is used in the evaluation.  
Figure 4 shows the minimum, average and maximum values for the reliability of the system. 
Note that the values are almost equal to one another, suggesting that the number of business 
segments under the scenarios simulated have no influence, as concluded in [52].  
 
Figure 4.  
Distribution the reliability for different number of business segments and comp_age = 4 
 
Figure 5 shows the importance of the components on the reliability of the system, evaluated 
using the rank correlation index (RCI). The RCI is able to capture possible nonlinear effects 
among the components variability and the system output [74].    
 
Figure 5. 
 Rank correlation index for different companies’ business segments and comp_age = 4 
 
As in the previous evaluation using the Birnbaum index, the action to improve the companies’ 
growth opportunities (mtb_mean1) is the most important factor for affecting the reliability of 
the system. Again, the rest of the components have less important effects in the trustworthiness 
of the company. However, note that in this case, the component vstr_grcguid_r, for different 
companies’ business segments is still the second most important component but with a greater 
potential influence than those observed in Figure 3. This aspect is aligned with the analysis of 
Wang & Hsu [70] and Mishra & Suar [71] regarding the role of social responsibility activities 





The results from mapping corporate governance components to a reliability model show that 
disclosure on a) compensation policy, b) remuneration and vesting options, and c) due 
reporting on independence of board function and board structure are central aspects for the 
operating state of the system. The results can also be considered as a complementary evidence 
of the role of transparency in corporate governance practices and mechanisms [15-16, 30] to 
study factors influencing firm performance using the theory of reliability system.      
Compensation policy discloses whether the corporate governance practices are based on 
competitive and balanced management compensation not only to attract and retain executives 
and board members. Remuneration and vesting options show whether that compensation is 
linked to individual or company targets (financial or non-financial). Both aspects allow 
aligning the incentives of the managers while protecting the interests of the shareholders. 
Remarkable problems associated with compensation were uncovered during the recent 
financial crisis, which notably are related to excessive remuneration experienced by managers 
in the main largest banks in U.S and Europe, jeopardizing the global financial system.  
Therefore, independence of board function and board structure show how well-balanced is the 
board of directors to have an independent decision-making process based upon their given 
responsibilities, commitment, and effectiveness to protect the firms value and shareholder 
interests. 
The results can also be considered as a complementary evidence of the role of transparency in 
corporate governance practices and mechanisms [15-16, 30], which always reduces 
asymmetries of information, to study factors influencing firm performance. Finally note that 
the model derived could be easily used for:  
I. Estimating the reliability of different types of companies (e.g., by altering the company 
age and the number business segments). 
II. Assessing the effects on the reliability of the system when considering the uncertainty 
that may exist regarding the probabilities of failure of the components of the system.  
III. Carrying out more detailed sensitivity studies for robustness (e.g., based on global 
sensitivity analysis [75]).  
IV. Analysing other systems outputs (e.g., bankruptcy and valuations) and integrating other 





In this paper, a reliability system approach is proposed to successfully mimic a corporate 
governance framework. The basic idea is to consider corporate governance as a complex 
system, composed of inputs related to corporate governance practices and mechanisms about  
reporting and transparency (i.e., components) and outputs (i.e., system performance). The 
system is mapped into a reliability model, where operating/failed states of components and 
company-specific conditions are used to define the structure function, given a selected 
company performance. The structure function is approximated using machine learning 
techniques and easily converted into an approximated reliability expression that could be used 
to quantify the reliability of any selected company, that is the probability that a company is 
outperforming the industry. The results of the proposed approach are evaluated using accepted 
performance measures, and the extracted SF mimic the behavior of the corporate governance 
system, complying with a lot of theoretical aspects described in the literature.  
The results of this paper not only show that growth opportunities matter for the proper 
functioning of the system but also suggest that if companies are more transparent (i.e., the 
probability of failure of specific components is low) both the trustworthiness of companies and 
the system reliability improve.  
This novel approach, tested on a set of listed U.S. companies, reveals how a full transparency 
perspective (reporting and disclosure) enhances the reliability of the system and helps to 
evaluate how well companies are controlled and managed. Consequently, this mapping can be 
seen as a more practical way to classify companies operating according to the shareholders’ 
interests, and to help them in the decision making process. Therefore, the board of directors can 
learn what corporate governance components are more pivotal for the most successful 
companies.  
Future research is required to consider other aspects of regulation, mainly associated with the 
external corporate governance practices, and other company-specific information, which might 
affect the operating state of the system. For example, one can further consider how to compare 
different corporate governance systems across countries [76], assess, comply or explain 
practices [33], evaluate the impacts of large shareholder and investors [77], and analyse other 
system perspectives (e.g. company valuation, financial distress, corporate bankruptcy, social 
and environmental responsibility of corporations, and company suitability). 
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Therefore, the research questions could also resort to additional models (e.g., multistate models 
[78, 106]) and signature function or the survival signature [85] in reliability modelling, data 
mining approaches [39], robustness analysis [79], multi-criteria methods [80-81]), as well as 
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Corporate governance as a system approach   
Authors Observations and perspectives 
Lipton & Lorsch [22] The cornerstone of the corporate governance system is the board of directors, which 
legitimates both actions taken and decisions made by managers in the name of the 
shareholders. Thus, the system should be able to produce meaningful information about the 
board of directors, company performance, and its managerial leadership. 
Holmstrom & Kaplan 
[23] 
One of the major risks for the corporate governance systems, especially in U.S, is 
overregulation, which can be costly and counterproductive for companies. However, because 
of many corporate governance scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has helped to renovate 
confidence in the U.S. corporate governance system, and these authors consider that a less 
effective system leads to poor company productivity and performance. However, it is 
important to assess executive compensation, shareholders’ interests, and the board of directors’ 
decisions. 
Strine [24] A rational corporate governance system should rely more on accountability, abandoning some 
unnecessary staggered or classified board, implementing clearer corporate elections, and 
controlling managerial compensation, without forgetting that companies should generate 
benefits for both shareholders and stakeholders (employees, communities, for example). 
Mason & Simmons [12] A corporate governance system has faith in the board of directors, who defines and exercises 
corporate strategies according to the key beneficiaries’ interests. For instance, one element into 
the systems is corporate social responsibility. It helps business as a linkage between 
companies’ outcomes and stakeholders’ viewpoints.    
García-Castro et al. [25] Corporate governance is perceived as an insider system (shareholder-oriented), mainly because 
the governance practices and mechanisms are noticeably interrelated with different firm 
perspectives (e.g., firm performance, value creation) 
Bellavite Pellegrini et 
al. [26] 
Corporate governance systems are observed from a separation perspective. Indeed, they 
consider the implications of the separation between managerial and supervisory bodies. For 
instance, in a one-tier system the board of directors and the supervisory board work together; 
and in a two-tier system both boards work separately.   
Aguilera & Crespi-
Cladera [11] 
These authors state that governance can be represented as a leadership system, with practices 
of managerial control, and norms and mechanisms that shape how companies are addressed 







Transparency (reporting and disclosure) into a corporate governance system 
Authors Comments and perspectives 
Adiloglu & Vuran [30] Corporate governance is a way to enhance transparency of the relationships between the 
shareholders, board of directors and managers in terms of roles and obligations to create 
sustainable value for all stakeholders. When companies are more transparent and information 
is accountable, investors’ confidence improves. Transparency is one of the ground aspects of a 
corporate governance system.  
Chen et al. [31] Poor reporting and disclosure create asymmetries of information for investors and produce 
large economic costs. Transparency helps shareholders to understand more thoroughly about a 
firm’s management and reputation and their impacts on performance (i.e., liquidity). 
Cormier et al. [15] Reporting and disclosure are central aspects of a firm’s governance configuration, showing 
that boards are effective enforcing the corporate governance mechanisms and reducing the 
monitoring costs incurred by investors. Reporting corporate governance information (practices 
and mechanisms) is less costly than making market participants to gather it.  
Hermalin & Weisbach 
[32] 
Disclosing corporate governance information is a good practice that reduces managerial fraud 
or theft, which is mostly stimulated by regulators and public scrutiny due to many corporate 
scandals reported (i.e., bankruptcies, market manipulations) that have affected shareholders. 
Luo & Salterio [33] Divulging corporate governance practices allows market participants not only to evaluate 
whether companies are managed effectively but also to make informed decisions (i.e., buy 
companies’ shares). Although disclosing can be mandatory or recommendatory, corporate 
governance depends mainly on their firm-specific characteristics. 
Mahr et al. [16] Under efficient information, the agency costs for firms with bad governance are higher than for 
those with good governance. Hence, shareholders are able to pay a higher price for the better-
governed companies because of the reduction in monitoring and auditing costs. 
Samaha et al. [34] Disclosing corporate governance practices uncovers companies’ strengths and weaknesses in 
performance, uncertainties, ownership dispersion, human resources capabilities, and so forth. 
Consequently, corporate governance disclosure can be associated with many attributes (i.e., 
board function and composition, board size, CEO duality, ownership and audit 







Component and system states for the 
network shown in Figure 1 
 
x1 x2 x3 x4 y = SF(x) 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 




Components and system states for a corporate governance system  
 
Companies x1= bs_poly_r x2= bs_expe_r x3= bs_noexe_r y = roa_mean1 
Comp01 1 1 1 1 
Comp02 1 1 1 0 
Comp03 0 0 1 0 
Comp04 1 1 1 1 
Comp05 1 1 1 1 
Comp06 1 1 1 0 
Comp07 1 1 1 1 
Comp08 0 1 1 0 
Comp09 1 1 1 0 
Comp10 1 1 1 1 
Comp11 1 1 0 1 
Comp12 1 1 1 0 
Comp13 1 1 1 1 
Comp14 1 1 1 0 
Comp15 1 1 1 0 
Comp16 1 1 1 1 
Comp17 1 1 1 0 
Comp18 1 1 1 0 







Sample size and classification 
 
Sectors-Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Basic 
Materials 
25 24 31 38 37 39 46 59 58 59 58 52 31 557 
Consumer 
Cyclicals 
51 51 68 84 88 89 119 130 142 149 141 118 93 1323 
Consumer 
Non-Cyclicals 
64 63 75 87 88 93 111 115 114 113 110 82 54 1169 
Energy 24 24 45 46 46 51 67 70 67 66 66 56 47 675 
Financials 29 32 65 82 80 82 118 130 130 140 133 78 48 1147 
Healthcare 32 34 50 53 48 49 59 68 68 67 65 49 33 675 
Industrials 47 49 66 72 70 74 111 129 130 129 124 106 78 1185 
Technology 46 49 62 73 69 76 87 110 113 114 107 79 65 1050 
Telecom. 
Services 
8 8 10 8 9 9 14 15 15 14 13 7 5 135 
Utilities 25 25 33 35 37 39 48 57 55 48 48 33 13 496 






Table 6  
Corporate governance components 




balanced the board 
of directors is into 
the corporate 
governance system. 
1. bs_poly_r Does a firm have a proper balance and diligence in the membership of the board? Y=1; N=0 
2. bs_expe_r 
Does the company report the number of years (average) each member has been on the board? 
Y=1; N=0 
3. bs_noexe_r 
Does the company disclose the percentage of (%) non-executive board members in the board? 
Y=1; N=0 
4. bs_indep_r Does the company report the % of independent board members? Y=1; N=0 
5. bs_duality_r Does the company report information about CEO-Chairman separation? Y=1, N=0 
6. bs_skills_r 
Does the company report either the skills of every board member, the age of individual board 
members? Y = 1,  N = 0 
7. bs_size_r 
Does the company report the total number of members in the board at the end of the fiscal 
period? Y = 1,  N = 0 
8. bs_divers_r Does the company report the % of women in the board? Y=1,  N=0 
B. Board function: 







Does the company disclose, for the audit committee, % of the independent board members 
according to the firm stipulations? Y = 1,  N = 0  
10. bf_imaudit_r 
Does the company report, for the audit committee, % of the non-executive board members 
according to the firm stipulations?  Y = 1,  N = 0 
11. bf_audexp_r 
Within the meaning of SOX for the audit committee, does the firm have at least three members 
and at least one "financial expert"? Y=1, N=0   
12. bf_icomcom_r 
Regarding the compensation committee, does the company disclose % of the independent 
board members according to the firm stipulations? Y=1, N=0 
13. bf_imcomcom_r 
Regarding the compensation committee, does the company disclose % of the non-executive 
board members according to the firm stipulations? Y=1, N=0 
14. bf_inomcom_r 
Does the company report % of the non-executive board members on the nomination 
committee? Y=1, N=0 
15. bf_imnoncom_r 
Regarding the nomination committee, does the company disclose % of the non-executive 
board members according to the firm stipulations? Y=1, N=0 
16. bf_bmeet_r Does the company report the number of board meetings? Y=1, N=0 
17. bf_bmeetave_r 
Does the company disclose the overall attendance (in percentage) of board meetings according 
to the firm stipulations? Y=1, N=0 
C. Compensation 







targets   
18. cpoly_com_r 
Does the company have a policy for performance-oriented compensation that attracts and 
retain senior executives and board members? Y=1, N=0 
19. cpoly_rem_r Does the company disclose the highest remuneration package? Y=1, N=0 
20. cpoly_brem_r 
Does the company disclose the total board member compensation of the non-executive board? 
Y=1, N=0 
21. cpoly_stok_r 
According to the firm's statutes or by-laws, do firms require that stock-options being 
contracted with a vote at a stockholder meeting?  Y=1, N=0 
22. cpoly_ltcom_r 
Does the company report the maximum time horizon of targets to reach full senior executives' 
compensation?  Y=1, N=0 
23. cpoly_vest_r 
Does the company report the number of years that most recently granted stock options or 










Does the company have a policy to treat equally shareholders (large and minority) or limit the 
usage of anti-takeover devices? Y=1, N=0 
25. shrt_votrt_r Are all shares of the company providing equal voting rights? Y=1, N=0 
26. shrt_own_r 
Regarding ownership, is the firm owned by a shareholder with majority of the voting rights, 
including veto of power? Y=0, N=1 
27. shrt_clabs_r Does the company have a classified board structure? Y=0, N=1. 
28. shrt_stabs_r Does the company have a staggered board structure? Y=0, N=1. 







aspects into the 
daily operations. 
29. vstr_chall_r 
Reporting information, is the company acknowledging openly the opportunities and 
difficulties of integrating financial and nonfinancial issues? Y=1, N=0 
30. vstr_csr_r Does the company have a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee or team? Y=1, N=0   
31. vstr_grcguid_r 
Is the CSR report published according the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) guidelines? Y=1, 
N=0  
32. vstr_csrrep_r Does the company's extra-financial report consider also its global activities? Y=1, N=0 
33. vstr_csrxaud_r 
Does the company consider an external auditor for its health & safety, social responsibility, 





List of Figures 
Figure 1. A four-component network [36]  
Figure 2. Example of a decision tree [36]  
Figure 3. Birnbaum index of components for a company with numbusegm =2 and comp_age =4 
Figure 4. Distribution the reliability for different number of business segments and comp_age = 4 







Figure 1. A four-component network [36] 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a decision tree [36] 
 





Figure 4. Distribution the reliability for different number of business segments and comp_age = 4 
 




















NBuseg 4 NBuseg 6 NBuseg 8





















NBuseg 4 NBuseg 6 NBuseg 8
